Microeconomic flexibility, by facilitating the process of creative-destruction, is at the core of economic growth in modern market economies. The main reason for why this process is not infinitely fast is the presence of adjustment costs, some of them technological, others institutional. Chief among the latter is labor market regulation. While few economists would object to such a view, its empirical support is rather weak. In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and find strong evidence for it. We use a new sectoral panel for 60 countries and a methodology suitable for such a panel. We find that job security regulation clearly hampers the creative-destruction process, especially in countries where regulations are likely to be enforced. Moving from the 20 th to the 80 th percentile in job security, in countries with strong rule of law, cuts the annual speed of adjustment to shocks by a third while shaving off about one percent from annual productivity growth. The same movement has negligible effects in countries with weak rule of law.
Introduction
Microeconomic flexibility, by facilitating the ongoing process of creative-destruction, is at the core of economic growth in modern market economies. This basic idea has been with economists for centuries, was brought to the fore by Schumpeter fifty years ago, and has recently been quantified in a wide variety of contexts. 1 In US Manufacturing, for example, more than half of aggregate productivity growth can be directly linked to this process. 2 The main obstacle faced by microeconomic flexibility is adjustment costs. Some of these costs are purely technological, others are institutional. Chief among the latter is labor market regulation, in particular job security provisions. The literature on the impact of labor market regulation on the many different economic, political and sociological variables associated to labor markets and their participants is extensive and contentious. However, the proposition that job security provisions reduce restructuring is a point of agreement.
Despite this consensus, the empirical evidence supporting the negative impact of labor market regulation on microeconomic flexibility has been scant at best. This is not too surprising, as the obstacles to empirical success are legions, including poor measurement of restructuring activity and labor market institutions variables, both within a country and more so across countries. In this paper we make a new attempt. We develop a methodology that allows us to bring together the extensive new data set on labor market regulation constructed by Djankov et al. (2003) with comparable cross-country cross-sectoral data on employment and output from the UNIDO (2002) data-set. We also emphasize the key distinction between effective and official labor market regulation.
The methodology builds on the simple partial-adjustment idea that larger adjustment costs are reflected in slower employment adjustment to shocks. 3 The accumulation of limited adjustment to these shocks builds a wedge between frictionless and actual employment, which is the main right hand side variable in this approach. We propose a new way of estimating this wedge, which allows us to pool data on labor market legislation with comparable employment and output data for a broad range of countries. As a result, we are able to enlarge the effective sample to 60 economies, more than double the country coverage of previous studies in this literature. 4 Our attempt to measure effective labor regulation interacts existing measures of job security provision with measures of rule of law and government efficiency.
Our results are clear and robust: countries with less effective job security legislation adjust more quickly to imbalances between frictionless and actual employment. In countries with strong rule of law, moving from the 20th to the 80th percentile of job security lowers the speed of adjustment to shocks by 35 percent and cuts annual productivity growth by 0.86 percent. The same movement for countries with low rule of law 1 See, e.g., the review in Caballero and Hammour (2000) . 2 See, e.g., Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) . 3 For surveys of the empirical literature on partial-adjustment see Nickell (1986) and Hammermesh (1993) . 4 To our knowledge, the broadest cross-country study to date -Nickell and Nuziata (2000) -included 20 high income OECD countries. Other recent studies, such as Burgess and Knetter (1998) and Burgess et al. (2000) , pool industry-level data from 7 OECD economies.
only reduces the speed of adjustment by approximately 1 percent and productivity growth by 0.02 percent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and describes the new data set. Section 3 discusses the main results and explores their robustness. Section 4 gauges the impact of effective labor protection on productivity growth. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
Overview
The starting point for our methodology is a simple adjustment hazard model, where the change in the number of (filled) jobs in sector j in country c between time t − 1 and t is a probabilistic (at least to the econometrician) function of the gap between desired and actual employment:
Gap jct ≡ e * jct − e jc,t−1 ,
where e jct and e * jct denote the logarithm of employment and desired employment, respectively. The random variable ψ jct , which is assumed i.i. Equation (1) hints at two important components of our methodology: We need to find a measure of the employment gap and a strategy to estimate the average (over j and t) speeds of adjustment (the λ c ).
We describe both ingredients in detail in what follows. In a nutshell, we construct estimates of e * jct , the only unobserved element of the gap, by solving the optimization problem of a sector's representative firm, as a function of observables such as labor productivity and a suitable proxy for the average market wage.
We estimate λ c from (1), based upon the large cross-sectional size of our sample and the well documented heterogeneity in the realizations of the gaps and the ψ jct 's (see, e.g., Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) for US evidence).
Details
Output and demand for a sector's representative firm are given by:
where y, p, e, a, h, d denote output, price, employment, productivity, hours worked and demand shocks, and η is the price elasticity of demand. We let γ ≡ (η − 1)/η, with η > 1, 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 and γ < 1/α.
All variables are in logs.
Firms are competitive in the labor market but pay wages that increase with the number of hours worked:
This can be approximated by:
with w o and µ determined by k o and Ω, and h constant over time and interpreted below. In order to ensure interior solutions, we assume αµ > β and µ > βγ.
A key assumption is that the representative firm within each sector only faces adjustment costs when it changes employment levels, not when it changes the number of hours worked (beyond overtime payments). 5 It follows that the sector's choice of hours in every period can be expressed in terms of its current level of employment, by solving the corresponding first order condition for hours.
In a frictionless labor market the firm's employment level also satisfies a simple static first order condition for employment. Our functional forms then imply that the optimal choice of hours, h, does not depend on the employment level. A patient calculation shows that
We denote the corresponding employment level by e and refer to it as the static employment target:
with C a constant that depends on µ, α, β and γ.
The following relation between the employment gap and the hours gap then follows:
This is the expression used by Caballero and Engel (1993) . It is not useful in our case, since we do not have information on worked hours. Yet the argument used to derive (5) also can be used to express the employment gap in terms of the marginal labor productivity gap:
where v denotes marginal productivity, φ ≡ µ/(µ − βγ) is decreasing in the elasticity of the marginal wage 5 For evidence on this see Sargent (1978) and Shapiro (1986) .
schedule with respect to average hours worked, µ − 1, and w o was defined in (4) . Note that e − e is the difference between the static target e and realized employment, not the dynamic employment gap e * jct − e jct related to the term on the right hand side of (1). However, if we assume that d + γa − w o follows a random walk (possibly with an exogenously time varying drift) -an assumption consistent with the data 6 -we have that e * jct is equal to e jct plus a constant δ ct . It follows that
where we have allowed for sector-specific differences in γ. Note that both marginal product and wages are in nominal terms. However, since these expressions are in logs, their difference eliminates the aggregate price level component.
We estimate the marginal productivity of labor, v jct , using output per worker multiplied by an industrylevel labor share, assumed constant whithin income groups and over time.
Two natural candidates to proxy for w o jct are the average (across sectors within a country, at a given point in time) of either observed wages or observed marginal productivities. The former is consistent with a competitive labor market, the latter may be expected to be more robust in settings with long-term contracts and multiple forms of compensation, where the salary may not represent the actual marginal cost of labor. 7 We performed estimations using both alternatives and found no discernible differences (see below). This suggests that statistical power comes mainly from the cross-section dimension, that is, from the well documented and large magnitude of sector-specific shocks. In what follows we report the more robust alternative and approximate w o by the average marginal productivity, which leads to:
where v ·ct denotes the average, over j, of v jct , and we use this convention for other variables as well. The expression above ignores systematic variations in labor productivity across sectors within a country, for example, because (unobserved) labor quality may differ systematically across sectors. The presence of such heterogeneity would tend to bias estimates of the speed of adjustment downward. To incorporate this possibility we subtract from (v jct − v ·ct ) in (7) a moving average of relative sectoral productivity, θ jct , where
As a robustness check, for our main specifications we also computed θ jct using a three and four periods moving average, without significant changes in our results (more on this when we check robustness in 6 Pooling all countries and sectors together, the first order autocorrelation of the measure of ∆e * jct constructed below is −0.018. Computing this correlation by country the mean value is 0.011 with a standard deviation of 0.179. 7 While we have assumed a simple competitive market for the base salary (salary for normal hours) within each sector, our procedure could easily accommodate other, more rent-sharing like, wage setting mechanisms (with a suitable reinterpretation of some parameters, but not λ c ). Section 3.2). The resulting expression for the estimated employment-gap is:
where αγ j is constructed using the sample median of the labor share for sector j across year and income groups.
Rearranging (8), we estimate φ from
where κ is a country-year dummy, ∆e * jct is the change in the desired level of employment and z jct ≡ (∆v jct − ∆v ·ct )/(1 − αγ j ). We assume that changes in sectoral labor composition are negligible between two consecutive years. In order to avoid the simultaneity bias present in this equation (∆v and ∆e * are clearly correlated) we estimate (9) using (∆w jct−1 − ∆w ·ct−1 ) as an instrument for (∆v jct − ∆v ·ct ). 8 Table 1 reports the estimation results of (9) for the full sample of countries and across income groups. The first two columns use the full sample, with and without two percent of extreme values for the independent variable, respectively. The remaining columns report the estimation results for each of our three income groups and job security groups (more on both of these measures in Section 2.2). Based on our results for the baseline case, we set the value of φ at its full sample estimate of 0.4 for all countries in our sample.
It is important to point out that our methodology has some advantages over standard partial adjustment estimations. First, it summarizes in a single variable all shocks faced by a sector. This feature allows us to increase precision and to study the determinants of the speed of adjustment using interaction terms. Second, and related, it only requires data on nominal output and employment, two standard and well-measured variables in most industrial surveys. Most previous studies on adjustment costs required measures of real output or an exogenous measure of sector demand. 9 
Regressions
The central empirical question of the present study is how cross-country differences in job security regulation affect the speed of adjustment. Accordingly, from (1) and (8) it follows that the basic equation we estimate is:
where ∆e jct is the log change in employment and λ ct denotes the speed of adjustment. We assume that the latter takes the form:
where JS eff ct is a measure of effective job security regulation. In practice we observe job security regulation (imperfectly), but not the rigor with which it is enforced. We proxy the latter with a "rule of law" variable, so that
where a is a constant and RL ct is a standard measure of rule of law (see below). Substituting this expression in (11) and the resulting expression for λ ct in (10), yields our main estimating equation:
with λ 3 = aλ 2 and δ ct denotes country×time fixed effects (proportional to the δ ct defined above).
The main coefficients of interest are λ 2 and λ 3 , which measure how the speed of adjustment varies across countries depending on their labor market regulation (both de jure and de facto).
The Data
This section describes our sample and main variables. Additional variables are defined as we introduce them later in the text.
Job Security and Rule of Law
We use two measures of job security, or legal protection against dismissal: the job security index constructed with JS c and HP ct . 10 We expect labor market legislation to have a larger impact on adjustment costs in countries with a stronger rule of law (higher RL c ) and more efficient governments (higher GE c ).
The institutional variables as well as the countries in our sample and their corresponding income group are reported in Table 2 . Table 3 reports the sample correlations between our main cross-country variables and summary statistics for each of these measures for three income groups (based on World Bank per capita income categories). 11 As expected, the correlation between the two measures of job security is positive and significant. Differences can be explained mainly by the broader scope of the JS ct index. Also as expected, rule of law and government efficiency increase with income levels. Note, however, that neither measure of job security is positively correlated with income per capita, since both JS ct and HP c are highest for middle income countries.
Industrial Statistics
Our output, employment and wage data come from the 2002 3-digit UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
The UNIDO database contains data for the period 1963-2000 for the 28 manufacturing sectors that correspond to the 3 digit ISIC code (revision 2). Because our measures of job security and rule of law are time invariant and measured in recent years, however, we restrict our sample to the period 1980-2000. Data on output and labor compensation are in current US dollars (inflation is removed through time effects in our regressions). Throughout the paper our main dependent variable is ∆e jct , the log change in total employment in sector j of country c in period t.
A large number of countries are included in the original dataset -however our sample is constrained by the cross-country availability of the independent variables measuring job security. In addition, we drop two percent of extreme employment changes in each of the three income groups. For our main specification the resulting sample includes 60 economies. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent variable by income group.
Results
This section presents our main result, showing that effective job security has a significant negative effect on the speed of adjustment of employment to shocks in the employment-gap. It also presents several robustness exercises.
Main results
Recall that our main estimating equation is:
Note that we have dropped time subscripts from JS c and RL c as we only use time invariant measures of rule of law and job security in our baseline estimation. Note also that in all specifications that include the (Gap ict × JS ct × RL c ) interaction we also include the respective Gap ict × RL c as a control variable.
We start by ignoring the effect of job security on the speed of adjustment, and set λ 2 and λ 3 equal to zero. This gives us an estimate of the average speed of adjustment and is reported in column 1 of Table 4 . On average (across countries and periods) we find that 60% of the employment-gap is closed in each period. Furthermore, our measure of the employment-gap and country×year fixed effects explain 60%
of the variance in log-employment growth.
The next three columns present our main results, which are repeated in columns 5 to 7 allowing for different λ 1 by sectors and country income level. 12 Column 2 (and 5) presents our estimate of λ 2 . This coefficient has the right sign and is significant at conventional confidence levels. Employment adjusts more slowly to shocks in the employment-gap in countries with higher levels of official job security.
Next, we allow for a distinction between effective and official job security. Results are reported in columns 3 and 4 (and, correspondingly, 6 and 7) for different rules-enforcement criteria. In columns 3 and 6 the distinction between effective and official job security is captured by the product of JS c and DSRL c , where DSRL c is a dummy variable for countries with strong rule of law (RL c ≥ RL Greece -where Greece is the OECD country with the lowest RL score). The three panels in Figure 1 show the value of the job security index for countries in the high, medium and low income groups, respectively. Now λ 2 becomes insignificant, while λ 3 has the right sign and is highly significant. That is, the same change in JS c will have a significantly larger (downward) effect on the speed of adjustment in countries with stricter enforcement of laws, as measured by our rule-of-law dummy. The effect of the estimated coefficients reported in column 3 is large.
In countries with strong rule of law, moving from the 20th percentile of job security (−0.19) to the 80th percentile (0.23) reducesλ by 0.22. The same change in job security legislation has a considerable smaller effect, 0.006, on the speed of adjustment in the group of economies with weak rule of law. Employment adjusts more slowly to shocks in the employment-gap in countries with higher levels of effective job security. Clearly, the results are very close to those reported in columns 3 and 7. Job security legislation has a significant negative effect on the estimated speed of adjustment when governments are effective -a proxy for enforcement of existing labor regulation.
Finally, the last column in Table 4 uses an alternative measure of job security. We repeat our specification from column 7 (including sector and income dummies) using the Heckman-Pages (2000) measure of job security. The HP ct data are only available for countries in the OECD and Latin America so our sample size is reduced by half, and most low income countries are dropped. The flip side is that this measure is time varying which potentially allows us to capture the effects of changes in the job security regulation. As reported in column 8, we find a negative and significant effect of HP ct on the speed of adjustment.
Further robustness
We continue our robustness exploration by assessing the impact of three broad econometric issues: alternative gap-measures, exclusion of potential (country) outliers, and misspecification due to endogeneity of the gap measure. Table 4 suggests that conditional on our measure of the employment-gap, our main findings are robust: job security, when enforced, has a significant negative impact on the speed of adjustment to the employment-gap. Table 5 tests the robustness of this result to alternative measures of the employment-gap. Columns 1 and 2 relax the assumption of a φ common across all countries. They repeat our baseline specifications -columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 -using the values of φ estimated per income-group reported in Table 1 . In turn, columns 3 and 4 report the results of using values of φ estimated across countries grouped by level of job security. 13 Next, columns 5 through 8 repeat our baseline specifications using a three and four period moving average to estimate θ jct . The final two columns (9 and 10) use an alternative specification for w o jct based on average wages instead of average productivity (see equation 8) to build Gap jct . In all of the specifications reported in Table 5 , our results remain qualitatively the same as in Table 4 . Table 6 reports estimates of λ 2 and λ 3 using the specification from column 3 in Table 4 but dropping one country from our sample at a time. In all cases the estimated coefficient on λ 3 is negative and significant at conventional confidence intervals. 13 Countries are grouped into the upper, middle and lower thirds of job security.
Alternative gap-measures
Exclusion of potential (country) outliers
However, it is also apparent in this table that excluding either Hong Kong or Kenya makes a substantial difference in the point estimates. For this reason, we re-estimate our model from scratch (that is, from φ up) now excluding these two countries. In this case the value of φ rises from 0.40 to 0.42. Qualitatively, however, the main results remain unchanged. Table 7 reports these results.
Potential endogeneity of the gap measure
One concern with our procedure is that the construction of the gap measure includes the change in employment. While this does not represent a problem under the null hypothesis of the model, any measurement error in employment and φz jt could introduce important biases. We address this issue with two procedures.
Before describing these procedures, we note that the standard solution of passing the ∆e-component of the gap defined in (8) to the left hand side of the estimating equation (10) does not work in our context.
Passing ∆e to the left suggests that the coefficient on the resulting gap will be equal to λ/(1 − λ). As shown in Appendix A, this holds only in the case of a partial adjustment model (ω = 0 in the notation of Section 2.1). By contrast, in the case of a Calvo-type adjustment (ω = 1), the corresponding coefficient will, on average, be negative. 14 More important, even small departures from a partial adjustment model (small values of ω) introduce significant biases when estimating λ using this approach.
Next we turn to the two procedures. The first procedure maintains our baseline specification, but instruments for the contemporaneous gap measure. Given that Gap jct = φz jt + ∆e jct can be rewritten as φz j,t−1 + ∆e * jct , a natural instrument is the lag of the ex-post gap, φz jc,t−1 . Unfortunately, the latter is not a valid instrument if it is computed with measurement error and this error is serially correlated. In our specification this could be the case because we use a moving average to construct the estimate of relative sectoral productivity, θ jct . To avoid this problem, we construct an alternative measure of the ex-post gap letting wage data play the role of productivity data when calculating the v and θ terms on the right hand side of (8).
The second procedure re-writes the model in a standard dynamic panel formulation that removes the contemporaneous employment change from the right hand side: 15 Table 8 reports the values of the average λ estimated with these two alternative, and much less precise, procedures. For comparison purposes, the first row reproduces the first column in Table 4 . The second row shows the result for the IV procedure based on using lagged wages as instruments. Finally, Row 3 reports the estimate from the dynamic panel. It is apparent from the table that the estimates of average λ are in the right ballpark, and hence we conclude that the bias due to a potentially endogenous gap is not significant. 14 In the Calvo-case, for every observation either the (modified) gap or the change in employment is zero. The former happens when adjustment takes place, the latter when it does not. It follows that the covariance of ∆e and the (modified) gap will be equal to minus the product of the mean of both variables. Since these means have the same sign, the estimated coefficient will be negative. See Appendix A for a formal derivation. 15 To estimate this equation we follow Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and use twice and three-times lagged values of ∆Gap jct as instruments for the RHS variable. Similar results are obtained if we follow Arellano and Bond (1991).
Gauging the Costs of Effective Labor Protection
By impairing worker movements from less to more productive units, effective labor protection reduces aggregate output and slows down economic growth. In this section we develop a simple framework to quantify this effect. Any such exercise requires strong assumptions and our approach is no exception. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that the costs of the microeconomic inflexibility caused by effective protection is large.
In countries with strong rule of law, moving from the 20th to the 80th percentile of job security lowers annual productivity growth somewhere between 0.9 and 1.2 percent. The same movement for countries with low rule of law has a negligible impact on TFP.
Consider a continuum of establishments, indexed by i, that adjust labor in response to productivity shocks, while their share of the economy's capital remains fixed over time. Their production functions exhibit constant returns to (aggregate) capital, K t , and decreasing returns to labor:
where B it denotes plant-level productivity and 0 < α < 1. The B it 's follow geometric random walks, that can be decomposed into the product of a common and an idiosyncratic component: . We set µ A = 0, since we are interested in the interaction between rigidities and idiosyncratic shocks, not in Jensen-inequality-type effects associated with aggregate shocks.
The price-elasticity of demand is η > 1. Aggregate labor is assumed constant and set equal to one. We define aggregate productivity, A t , as:
so that aggregate output,
Units adjust with probability λ c in every period, independent of their history and of what other units do that period. 16 The parameter that captures microeconomic flexibility is λ c . Higher values of λ c are associated with a faster reallocation of workers in response to productivity shocks.
Standard calculations show that the growth rate of output, g Y , satisfies:
where s denotes the savings rate (assumed exogenous) and δ the depreciation rate for capital. Now compare two economies that differ only in their degree of microeconomic flexibility, λ c,1 < λ c,2 .
Tedious but straightforward calculations relegated to Appendix B show that:
with θ = αγ(2 − αγ) 17 We choose parameters to apply (19) as follows: The mark-up is set at 20% (so that γ = 5/6), g Y,1 to the average rate of growth per worker in our sample for the 1980-1990 period, 0.7%, σ = 27%, 18 α = 2/3, and δ = 6%. Table 9 reports estimated speeds of adjustment across countries. Table 10 reports the average annual productivity costs of the deviation between each quintile and the bottom quintile in estimated speed of adjustment. These numbers are large. More important, they imply that moving from the 20th to the 80th percentile in job security, in countries with strong rule of law, reduces annual productivity growth by 0.86%.
The same change in job security legislation has a much smaller effect on TFP growth, 0.02%, in the group of economies with weak rule of law.
We are fully aware of the many caveats that such ceteris-paribus comparison can raise, but the point of the table is to provide an alternative metric of the potential significance of observed levels of effective labor protection. Moreover, these numbers are roughly consistent with what we obtain when running a regression of productivity growth on the estimated λ c 's for all the economies in our sample from 1980 to 1990 (see Table 11 and Figure 2) . Focusing on the results controlling for income groups (column 3), the coefficient on λ c is around 0.05 and significant at the 1 percent level. Combining these estimates with those in Column 3 of Table 4 implies that when moving from the 20th to the 80th percentile in job security, annual TFP growth falls by as much as 1.18% in countries with high rule of law. In contrast, a similar improvement in labor regulation in countries with low rule law reduces TFP growth by only 0.03%.
Concluding Remarks
Many papers have shown that, in theory, job security regulation depresses firm level hiring and firing decisions. Job security provisions increase the cost of reducing employment and therefore lead to fewer dis- 17 There also is a (static) jump in the level of aggregate productivity when λ increases, given by:
See Appendix B for the proof. 18 This is the average across the five countries considered in Caballero et al. (2004) . missals when firms are faced with negative shocks. Conversely, when faced with a positive shock, the optimal employment response takes into account the fact that workers may have to be fired in the future, and the employment response is smaller. The overall effect is a reduction of the speed of adjustment to shocks.
However, conclusive empirical evidence on the effects of job security regulation has been elusive. One important reason for this deficit has been the lack of information on employment regulation for a sufficiently large number of economies that can be integrated to cross sectional data on employment outcomes. In this paper we have developed a simple empirical methodology that has allowed us to fill some of the empirical gap by exploiting: (a) the recent publication of two cross-country surveys on employment regulations (Heckman and Pages (2000) and Djankov et al. (2003)) and, (b) the homogeneous data on employment and production available in the UNIDO dataset. Another important reason for the lack of empirical success is differences in the degree of regulation enforcement across countries. We address this problem by interacting the measures of employment regulation with different proxies for law-enforcement.
Using a dynamic labor demand specification we estimate the effects of job security across a sample of 60 countries for the period from 1980 to 1998. We consistently find a relatively lower speed of adjustment of employment in countries with high legal protection against dismissal, especially when such protection is likely to be enforced.
APPENDICES
A Endogeneity of the Gap Measure
The model is the one described in Section 2.1. Ignoring country differences and fixing t, 19 we have that
where x j ≡ e * jt − e j,t−1 and the ψ are i.i.d., independent of the x i , with mean λ and variance ωλ(1 − λ), 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. It follows from (20) that:
with u j ≡ (ψ j − λ)x j satisfying the properties of an error term in a standard regression setting. Thus, if we observe the ∆e j and x j and estimate (21), we obtain an unbiased and consistent estimator for λ. 20 Removing ∆e from the gap measure is equivalent to replacing x j by z j ≡ x j − ∆e j in (21) . It is obvious that z j = 0 when ψ = 1 and ∆e j = 0 when ψ j = 0. Since the two values ψ j takes in the Calvo case (ω = 1)
are 0 and 1, we have that when estimating the regression coefficient via OLS the covariance in the numerator will be equal to minus the product of the average of ∆e j and the average of the z j . Since both averages have the same sign, it follows that the regression coefficient will be negative (or zero if both averages are equal to zero).
Since we are considering sectoral data, the case ω = 1 may seem somewhat extreme. The following proposition shows that even for small departures from the partial adjustment case, the bias is likely to be significant.
Proposition 1 Consider the setting described above. Denote byβ the OLS estimate of the cofficient β in
Denote by µ and σ 2 the (theoretical) mean and variance of the x j 's. Then:
Proof From ∆e j = ψ j x j and z j = (1 − ψ j )x j it follows that:
and
Taking expectations over the ψ i , conditional on the x i , and letting N tend to infinity leads to:
The result now follows from the expression above and the fact that:
It follows that plim N→∞β is decreasing in ω, varying from λ/(1 − λ) when ω = 0 to −λµ 2 /(σ 2 + λµ 2 )
when ω = 1. It also follows that plim N→∞β is decreasing in |µ|, so that:
B Gauging the Costs
In this appendix we derive (19) . From (18) and (19) it follows that it suffices to show that under the assumptions in Section 4 we have:
where we have dropped the subindex c from the λ and
The intuition is easier if we consider the following, equivalent, problem. The economy consists of a very large and fixed number of firms (no entry or exit). Production by firm i during period t is
, where A i,t denotes productivity shocks, assumed to follow a geometric random walk, so that 21 That is, we ignore hours in the production function. In what follows lower case letters denote the logarithm of upper case variables. Similarly, * -variables denote the frictionless counterpart of the non-starred variable.
Solving the firm's maximization problem in the absence of adjustment costs leads to:
and hence ∆y *
Denote by Y * t aggregate production in period t if there were no frictions. It then follows from (26) that:
with τ ≡ 1/(1 − αγ), Taking expectations (over i for a particular realization of v A t ) on both sides of (27) and noting that both terms being multiplied on the r.h.s. are, by assumption, independent (random walk), yields
Averaging over all possible realizations of v A t (these fluctuations are not the ones we are interested in for the calculation at hand) leads to
and therefore for k = 1, 2, 3, ...:
Denote:
• Y t,t−k : aggregate Y that would attain in period t if firms had the frictionless optimal levels of labor corresponding to period t − k. This is the average Y for units that last adjusted k periods ago.
• Y i,t,t−k : the corresponding level of production of firm i in t.
From the expressions derived above it follows that:
and therefore
Taking expectations (with respect to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks) on both sides of the latter expression (here we use that ∆a i,t is independent of Y * i,t−1 ) yields
which combined with (29) leads to:
A derivation similar to the one above, leads to:
which combined with (29) gives:
with θ defined in (24).
Assuming Calvo-type adjustment with probability λ, we decompose aggregate production into the sum of the contributions of cohorts:
Substituting (30) in the expression above yields:
It follows that the production gap, defined as:
is equal to:
A first-order Taylor expansion then shows that, when |θ| << 1:
Subtracting this gap evaluated at λ 1 from its value evaluated at λ 2 , and noting that this gap difference corresponds to (A 2 − A 1 )/A 1 in the main text, yields (23) and therefore concludes the proof. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All estimates are significant at the 1% level. All regressions use lagged ∆w ict − ∆w ·ct as instrumental variable. As described in the main text, z jct represents the log-change of the nominal marginal productivity of labor in each sector, minus the country average, divided by one minus the estimated labor share. All regressions includes a country-year fixed effect (κ ct in (9) This table reports the estimated coefficients for λ 2 and λ 3 , for the specification in Column 3 of Table 4 , leaving out one country (the one indicated for each set of coefficients) at at time. Reported: change in annual growth rates associated with moving from the average adjustment speed of one quintile to the next. Quintiles for λ c from Table 9 , column with sectoral controls. Calculation based on model described in Section 4 (see equation (19) ). Parameter values: γ = 5/6), g Y,1 = 0.007, σ = 0.27 α = 2/3, and δ = 0.06. Tables 5.6 and Barro and Lee (1996) . WLS refers to weighted least squares, with weights inversely proportional to the standard deviation of estimated λ c 's. OLS refers to ordinary least squares.
